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TREATY LAW AND LEGAL TRANSITION COSTS
MICHAEL P. VAN ALSTINE*

INTRODUCTION

The dominant currency in contemporary debates over legal reform is benefit. That is, and almost by definition, changes in the law
most often are proposed and adopted based on perceptions of their
net substantive benefit. They promise, for instance, to remedy an inequity or correct some other recognized defect in the existing legal
order, modernize the law to reflect new social or technological realities, remove inefficiencies that frustrate desirable forms of human interaction, or (relatedly) harmonize inconsistent rules across jurisdictions.
This traditional focus on substantive benefits and costs-although of course important on its own plane-overlooks the
transitional friction associated with legal change itself. As I argued in
a recent article,1 a legal system can experience substantial friction
simply in accommodating the existence of new legal norms. Broadly,
these "legal transition costs" arise from the need to learn about the
content of new legal norms and the uncertainty and error costs that
flow from the loss of the accrued experience with the old legal regime
as well as from contending with doubts about the new one. Significantly, these costs of accommodating new legal norms will arisealthough in differing degrees in different contexts- irrespective of the
substantive policy goals the new norms pursue and of the particular
regulatory vehicle by which they come into being-whether by
statute, administrative regulation, treaty, or otherwise.
The phenomenon of legal transition costs thus applies to the
adoption of new international legal norms as well. Indeed, there is
reason to believe that the internationalization of the law poses special
problems, in particular with regard to new multilateral treaty law
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. J.D. 1986, George
Washington University; Mag. Jur. Comp. 1993, Dr. Juris. 1994, The University of Bonn,
Germany.
1. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002).
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norms designed to regulate the rights and obligations of private actors. Among other things, the complexity of the multinational lawmaking process may heighten the risk of indeterminacy with new
international private law norms. As well, the interaction with the
preexisting national law may spawn difficult questions of norm hierarchy. These problems are only compounded by the fact (at least in
the present political configuration) that uniform international private
law norms must be interpreted and applied by disparate national
courts. Controversies may even arise-as is evidenced by recent
scholarly debates in this country 2-about whether private law norms
properly may be the subject of an international treaty, as opposed to
more traditional forms of domestic legislation.
These questions also play an integral role in the theme of this
Symposium, "Constructing International Intellectual Property Law:
The Role of National Courts." My goal in this Article is to offer
some initial observations on the role transition cost analysis should
play in the continuing development of international private law, including international intellectual property law. More specifically, I
will suggest here that concerns about the transitional friction associated with the integration of new international norms into the broader
web of the law also apply to the more specific subject of the Symposium, the draft treaty on jurisdiction and enforcement of intellectual
property judgments prepared by Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and
Jane Ginsburg.3
As we shall see below, however, the message of transition cost
analysis is not a negative one. That is, a recognition that the costs of
legal transitions are real and can be substantial does not mean that
there is something inherently inefficient about legal change. Rather,
transition cost analysis focuses attention beyond the traditional currency of substantive benefits and costs to the importance of the assimilation of new legal norms as well. The analysis thus underscores
for lawmakers that a sensitivity to the phenomenon of legal transition
costs can facilitate both the acceptance and effectiveness of legal reforms.
As I examine in the latter half of this Article, such a sensitivity
will require a more active attention to available drafting and implementation techniques that can mitigate transitional friction before it
2. I discuss this controversy in more detail infra note 20 and accompanying text.
3. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002).
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arises. Moreover, and more importantly for the subject of this symposium, transition cost analysis highlights for lawmakers the important role of "mediating institutions" in ameliorating the transitional
impact of changes in the law, particularly in the form of new international private law norms. We will see below that by facilitating cooperation among existing national courts and creating new forms of
international mediating institutions, lawmakers may substantially
mitigate the learning, uncertainty, and kindred costs of new private
law conventions such as that proposed by Professors Dreyfuss and
Ginsburg for the recognition of international intellectual property
judgments.
I.

LEGAL TRANSITION COSTS: AN OVERVIEW

The notion of legal transition costs reflects a simple, but potentially significant, idea: that a legal system will experience transitional
friction simply in adjusting to the existence of a new positive law
norm. To set the context for an examination of the implications of
transition cost analysis for the continuing internationalization of the
law, this Section will first briefly review the nature of legal transition
costs and why they are worthy of our attention.
I have examined in detail elsewhere the distinct sources and
types of costs that arise from a change in state-created legal regimes. 4
These costs can be distilled into the following principal categories: (1)
the learning costs associated with determining the content of new legal norms; (2) the uncertainty costs that arise from the absence of
authoritative determinations about the meaning and effect of new
norms; (3) the effects of a likely increase in error costs through mistakes in their articulation and later interpretation; (4) private adjustment costs, both intra-party and inter-party, which arise from the
need of private actors to adapt their forms and practices to accommodate new law; and (5) the parallel transition costs incurred by
courts and other public institutions in contending with new legal
norms. Although for ease of exposition there is a value in organizing
the analysis around these rough categories, as the following brief
summary indicates there may be substantial interaction and overlap
between the various forms of legal transition costs.

4. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 816-50.
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Learning Costs

In our increasingly detailed and complicated modern legal envi5
ronment, the most basic of legal transition costs are learning costs.
Legal actors must identify what rules of law are relevant to their af-

fairs; they must study the scope and content of the applicable ones;
and they must master the details of the law's more complex and tech-

nical provisions. Most often, of course, legal actors do not incur these
costs through direct investigation; rather, they find-at least those
with the resources and desire to do so 6-that

it is more efficient to

consult experts (lawyers, accountants, and the like) with specialized
education and experience in the law.
Over time, the learning costs for a given body of law are likely to
decrease, as interpretive opinions and scholarly analyses add coher7
ence to the law and legal actors gain familiarity with its content.

Moreover, as familiarity grows, the interaction among the various legal actors in a legal community can lead 8to a dispersion of the collective learning benefits accumulated by all.
Nonetheless, even in this collective sense the process involved in

learning the law involves costs, both in direct financial terms and in
the dedication of time and effort. In turn, whenever the state determines to change the law-whether through the revision of existing
norms or the introduction of new ones-the result will be a new
round of learning costs for all affected legal actors, and in the aggregate for the legal system as a whole. Among other things, affected le-

gal actors confronted with a new body of legal norms will have to sort
out questions of scope and effect, master new complexities, and resolve the interaction both with the old legal regime and with related
bodies of law. To be sure, the amount of such costs will vary in rela5. For a more detailed analysis of the learning costs of new law, see Van Alstine, supra
note 1, at 816-22.
6. A failure to learn the law relevant to one's activities bears its own risks. See id. at 84750 (discussing this phenomenon in terms of "ignorance costs").
7. A variety of public and private institutions also contribute to a dispersion of knowledge
about the law. The most notable in this regard are the public judiciary, through their published
legal opinions, and legal educators, through their publication of treatises and other scholarly
works. See id. at 817-18 (examining in more detail the contribution of these and similar
institutions in decreasing the learning costs of new law).
8. See id. at 818-19; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardizationand
Innovation in CorporateContracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713,
736-40 (1997) (analyzing dispersion of accumulated learning benefits among legal actors with
regard to commonly used contractual terms); Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform
Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 692-93 (1999) (examining the benefits that flow from prior
learning about the law).
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tion to the ambition, complexity, and precision of the law reform
project. Nonetheless, the learning costs of new legal norms are real
and will be incurred by all participants in a legal system, from lay ac-

tors to legal professionals, and even to judges and other adjudicators.
The phenomenon of learning costs also applies with the introduc-

tion of new international private law norms. Indeed, even at this
most basic form of transition costs there is reason to believe that the
impact may be more pronounced in the international law context. As
experience in this country with at least one existing private law treaty
suggests, 9 there may be a comparative lack of familiarity by legal

practitioners of the precise nature and effect of treaty law, and even
of its existence.10
These special concerns suggest that particular care is warranted
in the preparation and implementation of new international treaty
law, such as that proposed by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg. As

mentioned in the introduction to this Article, the goal of transition
cost analysis is to focus attention on the impact of undisciplined legal

change, even with norms that promise significant substantive benefits.
The potential for enhanced learning costs with new international private law norms only heightens for lawmakers the importance of their
role at the drafting stage in addressing legal transition costs before

they arise.

9. The treaty referred to here is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, which the United States ratified in 1986. See Final Act of the
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Conference
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), republished
at 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987) [hereinafter CISG]. Although the Treaty has been in effect for over
a decade and has been accepted by over sixty countries, there is a surprising lack of knowledge
about its existence. See, e.g., James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on
Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International
Sales, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 273, 280 (1999) ("[M]any U.S. businesses, lawyers and courts have
yet to realize that contracts they assume are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
are actually governed by the CISG. The dearth of U.S. case law concerning the CISG despite its
ten years of applicability to the majority of U.S. international sales transactions is itself evidence
of the lack of awareness of the CISG in the United States." (footnote omitted)).
10. Concerns about the effect of the learning costs have even led one scholar to question
whether excessive novelty in the U.N. Sales Convention may compromise its ultimate success.
See Walt, supra note 8, at 698-705 (suggesting that the costs of learning the CISG as well as the
inability of transactors to internalize the learning benefits they confer through public
litigation-which he discusses in terms of a "learning externality" -may lead transactors to opt
out of its application and thus compromise the law's goal of fostering international uniformity).
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Uncertainty Costs

The adoption of international legal norms in the form of a treaty
also may pose special concerns with regard to uncertainty costs. Although they often run in parallel with the costs of learning new law,
uncertainty costs are conceptually different and ultimately more significant."t
Uncertainty costs arise from the simple fact that even after the
most detailed and careful examination of new legal norms a variety of

questions of meaning, scope, and effect are likely to remain. In other
words, even after a legal system has resolved all that can be learned

about the new norms, some level of uncertainty likely will remain.
When, as in the case of a private law treaty, a legal reform also involves regulation at a higher level of social organization,"2 the risk of

uncertainty in the interaction with the existing body of law is particularly acute.
Uncertainty costs can arise in what might be viewed as back-

ward-looking and forward-looking forms. The former involve the loss
of the accumulated certainty in a given field of law. The focus here is
principally on the value of interpretive precedent. Whenever a
competent court issues an interpretive ruling on a disputed issue of
law, the resultant increase in certainty in the law in effect reflects a
public good-a benefit that is accessible by all members of a legal system, but is exhaustible by none. 3 Interpretive precedent can clarify
ambiguous legal norms, bring cohesion to a large or intricate body of
law, and resolve issues of norm hierarchy. 14 The cumulative effect of

this process over time is a progressive enhancement of the certainty in
a given body of legal norms. 15 Thus, when the state decides to replace
11. For a more detailed analysis of the uncertainty costs of new law, see Van Alstine, supra
note 1, at 822-35.
12. For an analysis of this point, see Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory
Competition, Externalization,and Jurisdiction,34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 49 (1993) (observing that
cooperation among formally sovereign states at the international level "constrains horizontal
competition and is equivalent to a move up the scale of social organization to
institutionalization (or regulation) at a higher level of social organization").
13. For a review of these key attributes of a public good in the context of intellectual
property law, see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification,86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 261 n.96 (1998) (describing a public good as one that is "nonexcludable," which means that one user cannot exclude use by others, and "non-rivalrous,"
which means that the use of the good by one person does not diminish its availability for others)
and Clarisa Long, Patents & Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 229, 231 (2000)
(describing the same attributes).
14. For more on this point, see Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 824-28.
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an established body of law with a new and untested one, it risks
wasting a valuable societal investment.
This aspect of uncertainty costs may be of less concern, however,
for the particular legal reforms proposed by the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
treaty. The very problem that this proposed treaty is designed to address is the absence of an effective legal infrastructure for the recognition and enforcement of intellectual property judgments. 16 The
proposed treaty would not displace an established legal regime, but
rather fill a gap in international intellectual property law. There is, in
other words, no established body of international norms in the field
that would be compromised by the adoption of the proposed
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty. To be sure, there exists a rough patchwork
of national rules and procedures for the local enforcement of judgments; and there may be limited aspects of the existing rules that may
be worthy of express adoption.17 Nonetheless, because the existing
system is beset by substantial doubts with regard to the enforcement
of international intellectual property judgments, the DreyfussGinsburg treaty is unlikely to compromise in any material way the accumulated certainty in the field.
In contrast, the adoption of new legal norms through the mechanism of a treaty may risk the imposition of substantial uncertainty
costs when viewed ex ante. That is, apart from the backward-looking
loss of accumulated legal certainty, the adoption of new legal norms
represents a new moment for uncertainty about their precise meaning
and effect.
This forward-looking component of uncertainty may impose
costs on legal actors in a variety of ways. Without authoritative interpretation of ambiguous provisions, legal actors will incur increased
planning costs to address the expanded range of possible meanings.
A similar effect on legal professionals will decrease the reliability of
expert legal advice, and thus increase the risk of definitive action.
Derivatively, the uncertainty associated with a new legal regime may
15. This is a well-recognized benefit of legal precedent. See, e.g., Michael Klausner,
Corporations,CorporateLaw, and Networks of Contract,81 VA. L. REV. 757, 777 (1995) (noting
that "scholars writing from a variety of perspectives have observed that precedents in general
reduce the uncertainty of the legal rule they interpret"). But see Anthony D'Amato, Legal
Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1983) (observing that a proliferation of bodies with the
authority to issue interpretive rulings on a single issue may lead to an increase in uncertainty).
16. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1065-66 (describing the benefits of a single
international jurisdiction and judgments convention).
17. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the value of reaping the
accrued certainty of the existing legal order).
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lead to increased dispute resolution costs, both from an expansion of
the universe of potential disputes and from a decrease in the likelihood of their extrajudicial settlement. 8
These forward-looking uncertainty costs will vary in direct relation to the precision of the legal norm at issue. Narrow, rigid rules,
for example, are likely to involve relatively limited uncertainty costs.
In contrast, flexible, open-ended standards may leave considerable
postadoption uncertainty. Because norms in this form take on functional content only through progressive judicial application over time,
upon their initial adoption substantial room likely will remain for disputes over their intended application. 9
The ready message from an appreciation of these uncertainty
costs is that increased care in the articulation of new legal norms can
provide significant benefits for affected legal actors. This point is particularly significant with regard to transjurisdictional legal reform. 2°
Because responsibility for interpretation and application remains with
the disparate national courts, there is, among other problems, no single institution with the power to render authoritative judgments on
18. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 830-32 (discussing the increased negotiation and
dispute resolution costs that attend legal uncertainty).
19. This does not mean that narrow rules should always be the preferred structure for new
legal norms. Among other things, a recognition of a need for situational flexibility or of the
benefits of a gradual evolution and development by courts in a field of law over time may
suggest that standards are the better normative model. By focusing on the relative costs of
transition between the two options, transition cost analysis also may inform the continuing
debate over the choice between rules and standards. For more on this point, see Van Alstine,
supra note 1, at 832-34.
20. There is also a more fundamental concern about private law treaties, but it is one over
which lawmakers may have little control. Recent and heated scholarly controversies about the
precise nature of treaties in our domestic legal system create what might be called "metauncertainty costs." Some scholars have argued that there are important limitations on the
substantive matters that properly may be the subject of treaties. See Curtis A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) (arguing that the
substantive limitations in the interstate commerce clause also limit the power of the federal
government with regard to treaties). But see David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation:
The HistoricalFoundationsof the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1075 (2000) (offering a comprehensive challenge to Professor Bradley's argument). Separately,
Professor John Yoo has argued that the Constitution entirely prohibits self-executing treaties
(those that take effect without implementation by congressional legislation), or at least on
matters within Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution: Treaties,Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REV.
1955, 2092 (1999) (suggesting the possibility of such an approach). As an alternative, he has
suggested that there should at least be a presumption against self-execution. Id. at 2093-94; see
John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of NonSelf-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2220 (1999) (describing this approach as a "soft" rule
under which courts should require the treatymakers "to issue a clear statement if they want a
treaty to be self-executing"). But see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 2154, 2157-58 (1999) (disagreeing with Professor Yoo's conclusions).
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uncertain provisions. As a result, there may be more serious structural impediments, as compared to domestic law norms, to a timely
and effective reduction in the uncertainty costs of new multilateral
treaty law. I will have more to say on this point below. 2 1 It suffices at
this stage in the analysis to observe that an antidote to uncertainty
costs is to enhance the effectiveness of "mediating institutions" in
speeding the resolution of the difficult interpretive issues that arise
from the adoption of new legal norms.
C.

ErrorCosts

Another form of legal transition costs arises from the risk of error in the adoption of new legal norms. A close, but particularly pernicious, relative of uncertainty costs, such error costs issue from
imperfections in the articulation or mistakes in the application of new
law. Once again, this does not mean that there is something inherently suspect about legal change; it simply means that the adoption of
new norms represents a new moment for error in their initial formula22
tion or subsequent interpretation.
The errors that attend legal transitions can be corrected, of
course. For instance, subsequent legislative review and amendment
can cure mistakes in the articulation of new legal norms-such as the
commonplace formulation errors of unintended incompleteness,
overbreadth, or inconsistency. Active judicial examination of background and context likewise can make sense of otherwise faulty legislative signals. In a similar way, improvident interpretive decisions
by courts or administrative bodies can be corrected through subsequent reexamination or through review by superior courts. On most
issues of law, legislative bodies have the power to do the same.
Such errors associated with the adoption of new legal norms
nonetheless impose costs on affected legal actors, and thus on the legal system as a whole. Most notably, legislative formulations or judicial interpretations later discovered to be faulty can cause legal actors
to make wasteful investments. Moreover, error correction itself involves costs. In addition to the public resources necessary to review
and correct the error, there will be increased public and private dis-

21. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
22. For a more detailed analysis of the error costs of new law, see Van Alstine, supra note
1, at 845-50.
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pute resolution costs as the erroneous signals foment avoidable litigation.
Once again, there is reason to believe that the problem of error
costs may be particularly acute with the adoption of new international
legal regimes. First, the difficulty of formulating precise legal mandates, manifest even in our relatively stable legal system, is compounded when the mandates arise from and are intended to govern
disparate legal and political cultures. The heterogeneity of the participants in the lawmaking process, the difficulty of effective communication, and the need to translate legal concepts into different
official languages increase the challenges for the drafters of transna23
tional norms.
Moreover, and perhaps of greater concern, the means of effective
legislative correction of drafting errors are substantially circumscribed with new multinational legal regimes because revision of an
international treaty requires the renewed consent of each member
state to the original treaty. As a result, even where feasible, the process for the amendment of a multilateral treaty that is already in force
is likely to be a long and arduous one.
The impact of judicial error in the subsequent interpretation of
multilateral treaties, in particular those of a private law nature, raises
equal challenges. Unlike unified legal systems, there exists no final
arbiter for the interpretation of such a treaty. (Indeed, this Symposium, which is directed to the role of national courts in constructing
international intellectual property law, in no small measure arises out
of a recognition of this fundamental problem.) As a result, multilateral treaties designed to unify the law in fact may carry their own
seeds of potential disunity, as the means of international redress for
an erroneous interpretation by one national court will be severely
limited.
These concerns again highlight the importance of sensitivity to
the potential for increased error costs in the adoption of new international norms such as those proposed by the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty.
The ready point is that the difficult lawmaking process for multinational treaties mandates increased care in formulation in order to

23. Professor John Honnold's observation about the challenges of uniform international
law is particularly apt in this regard: "[W]ords [are] mushy, ambiguous things even for ordinary
communications.... International unification of law raises these difficulties to a higher power."
John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action-Uniform International Words: Uniform
Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 207 (1988).
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avoid or mitigate the impact of drafting errors. With regard to the
risks of interpretive error, the difficulties that arise from a system of
national courts are not insurmountable. Instead, as I will examine
below, this problem only underscores the importance of examining
other forms of mediating institutions designed to assist in the effective
assimilation of new international legal norms.
D.

PrivateAdjustment Costs

The costs of transition between legal regimes also include the

impact on private practices that have developed within the framework of the old legal order. Any body of law designed to regulate

continuing activity-if applied by authorities with consistency over
time-also will facilitate the development of private conventions de-

signed to implement, supplement, and (where allowed) adjust the
positive law norms. The adoption of new substantive international

norms to regulate continuing private behavior may of course also occasion this form of legal transition costs. 24 As I will note below, however, private adjustment costs may be of less concern for targeted
procedural rules, such as the proposed Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty. A
complete understanding of the phenomenon of legal transition costs
nonetheless mandates a brief examination of private adjustment
costs.

25

One of the benefits of stability in the law is that it can stimulate
private actors to develop efficient standardized conventions to regulate their affairs in the interstices of the law. For individuals or single
firms, this standardization takes the form of cost-saving administrative practices and forms designed for multiple or repeat use. Similarly, certainty and stability in the law can speed the development of
networks of efficient interparty contacts, especially standardized contractual formulations. 26 Like intraparty forms, these networks operate to complement or fine-tune the express provisions of positive law.
24. A good example of this is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods. CISG, supra note 9. This international private law treaty
comprehensively regulates the rights and obligations of buyers and sellers involved in defined
international sales transactions. See id. art. 4.
25. For a more detailed analysis of the private adjustment costs often associated with a
change in the law, see Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 836-45.
26. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 8, at 763-64 (analyzing the role of the law in
facilitating the creation of private networks of standardized contractual terms); Charles J. Goetz
& Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 286-88 (1985) (examining the value
of state supplied background rules in facilitating the development of networks of standardized
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Such intra- and interparty standardization is beneficial for private actors in a variety of ways. Among other things, the distillation
of accumulated experience into a permanent form creates learning
benefits, decreases application errors, and frees transactors from the
resource costs of crafting individualized solutions for each new transaction. The development of private conventions, however, involves
significant transaction costs. Most important, these include the resource costs of the time, effort, and risk associated with developing,
testing, and revising a form or practice over time.
When the state decides to alter the legal environment, therefore,
adjustment costs will arise from the impact on these private conventions. In other words, just as stability in the law can facilitate the development of efficient standardized forms and practices, a change in
the positive law can compromise them. The net effect is the imposition of private legal transition costs from the loss of the accrued benefits of the established conventions and the resource costs of
developing new ones.
It would appear that, because it is designed principally to facilitate a single legal act-the recognition and enforcement of international intellectual property judgments-the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty
should not raise significant concerns about private adjustment costs.
Even here, to be sure, a variety of forms will need to be developed to
ensure the efficient application of legal rules that the treaty would introduce, the costs of which will be borne not only by private transactors but also by public institutions.27 Nonetheless, it is likely-in
particular given that such a treaty in large measure will fill a gap in
the existing legal infrastructure-that private adjustment costs should
not be as significant a concern for the targeted judgments convention
under consideration here.
E. Public Legal Transition Costs
Legal transition costs are not only a private phenomenon. Because the state is involved not only in the creation of law, but in its
administration and application as well, public institutions also may incur the transition costs associated with legal change. 28 This is par-

contract terms).
27. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
28. For a more detailed analysis of the notion of public transition costs, see Van Alstine,
supra note 1, at 850-52.
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ticularly true with legal norms that will involve public institutions,
such as the jurisdiction and judgment rules proposed by the DreyfussGinsburg treaty. Here, the focal point for disputes over the application of the law of necessity will be public institutions, specifically
national court systems.
Public court systems in effect represent an elaborate state subsidy for the resolution of societal disputes. Because of this involve-

ment in dispute resolution, the public legal transition costs associated
with the adoption of new law will parallel those for private actors.
Learning costs, for instance, will arise from the need of state judicial

officers (especially those in courts of general jurisdiction)29 to master
the new law. A failure to do so may lead to more prolonged and
error-prone proceedings. Moreover, a likely consequence of the un-

certainty that often attends the introduction of new legal norms is an
increase in the frequency of disputes (both legitimate and specious)30
and a decrease in the likelihood of their extrajudicial settlement." In

a similar way, the likely increase in interpretive error-which is particularly problematic with multilateral treaties 32-also

will foment

avoidable litigation. Through the litigation infrastructure provided by
its court system, the state itself will bear an appreciable part of the
costs of this increased activity.
Most often, these public transition costs are a mere second-tier
consequence of the uncertainty costs that private actors must bear in
contending with new legal norms.

In the case of procedural rules

such as the proposed Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty, however, the state
court system is the very subject of regulation. Disputes over jurisdiction and over the propriety of the recognition or enforcement of
29. This effect may be diminished substantially when an area of the law is entrusted to
courts of special jurisdiction. For example, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals with its
specialized jurisdiction for matters of patent law (among other things) and the Delaware Court
of Chancery for corporate law matters are more likely to follow developments in their
respective fields and thus have a shorter learning curve for relevant changes in the law. For a
discussion of why a greater reliance on specialized courts might decrease the costs of legal
transitions, see infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
30. Uncertainty in the law also may increase the likelihood of opportunism, for as doubt
about the precise content of the law grows, so too will the latitude for dubious claims masked as
legitimate argumentation. For more on this point, see Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 835-36. Cf
Timothy J. Muris, OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of Contracts,65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 52122 (1981) (examining the phenomenon of "subtle opportunism" in contractual relationships, and
noting that, because it is difficult to detect and is easily masked as legitimate conduct, it is
"discoverable only at a high cost").
31. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing the increased likelihood and
consequences of interpretive error for multilateral treaties).
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judgments will necessarily involve the public court system. As a result, the adoption of such a treaty will involve direct learning, uncertainty, and error costs for state judicial officers. Moreover, because of
the state court systems' direct role in application, such a jurisdiction
and enforcement treaty will impose drafting and administrative
adjustment costs on them that parallel the costs private actors often

33
bear in adapting their affairs to new legal norms.
In short, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty presents a particularly

stark example of the public transition costs that can arise from legal
change. It thus highlights the importance of a sensitivity to the phe-

nomenon of legal transition costs for public institutions as well. 34 In
other words, this public aspect again focuses attention on the need to
attend not only to the substantive value of new legal norms, but also
to their efficient assimilation into the broader web of the law. I now

turn to this important message of transition cost analysis.
II.

THE POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSITION COST ANALYSIS
FOR THE PROPOSED IIP JUDGMENTS TREATY

The adoption of new legal norms can bring substantial societal
benefits. In addition to advancing important social causes, legal

change can facilitate socially desirable human activities or otherwise
diminish the transaction costs that inhibit valuable economic transactions. Indeed, the uniform law movement, both domestically and in-

ternationally, represents one of the best examples of the ability of
new legal norms to remove some of the impediments to valuable
forms of human interchange.35 The very purpose of uniform legal
rules across jurisdictions is to minimize the learning costs concerning
the content of foreign law, clear away uncertainties over the identification of applicable law, and create a uniform and stable legal frame-

33. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
34. One benefit of this direct state involvement in the application of the proposed treaty is
that it may decrease the effect of "fiscal illusion." This describes the likely tendency of
lawmakers to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of legal reforms. See Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 567 (1989)
(describing this phenomenon).
35. For more on these benefits of uniform law, see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138 (1996)
(discussing the efficiency gains potentially offered by uniform rules across different
jurisdictions); David Charney, CompetitionAmong Jurisdictionsin FormulatingCorporateLaw
Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 442, 445-46 (1991) (discussing same regarding the specific subject of
international corporate law).
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work to facilitate cross-border transactions. The proposed
international intellectual property judgments treaty-like the broader
Hague Judgments Convention under negotiation 36-also promises to
decrease the transaction costs associated with the enforcement of IIP
judgments and thereby enhance the value of the substantive norms of
international intellectual property law.
A recognition of the phenomenon of legal transition costs does
not challenge these substantive benefits of legal change. Rather, the
basic message is that without effective accommodation, transitional
friction may compromise the value of new legal norms, perhaps substantially so. In the worst case, by fomenting avoidable litigation and
in creating excessive legal uncertainty, substantively beneficial but
undisciplined legal change may do more harm than good.
My goal in the Section to follow is to offer some initial observations on how the legal transition costs associated with the proposed
international judgments convention might be mitigated, and thus how
the drafters and scholars might address the source of some opposition
to its adoption. As we shall see below, lawmakers have at their disposal a variety of means by which they can prospectively address the
transitional impact of new law.
A.

Mitigating Legal Transition Costs

Transition cost analysis underscores for lawmakers that they
have a role not only in the creation of new law but also in its effective
assimilation and application by the legal system as a whole. The principal means of doing so is through increased diligence at the drafting
stage. The ready point here is that increased care in the structuring
and articulation of new legal norms can prospectively mitigate the associated learning costs, decrease the amount of uncertainty, and avoid
harmful formulation errors. In so doing, lawmakers in effect internalize the legal transition costs of new norms ex ante.
Indeed, this enhanced role of lawmakers may be particularly important with regard to new international legal norms. A simple lack
of familiarity with the treaty-making process, together with the fact
that treaties often reflect an amalgam of foreign legal concepts, increases the likely extent and impact of transition costs. By the same
36. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, drafts at http://www.hcch.
net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (Oct. 30, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Draft Hague Convention].
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token, these considerations increase the importance of addressing the
transitional friction associated with new treaty law at the drafting
stage.3 7 In this light, the already long and deliberate process in the
negotiation of the parallel Hague Judgments Convention may be a

positive, even if for some a frustrating, sign.
The particular characteristics of new treaty law also counsels

more active consideration of meta-approaches to legal transition
costs. The first of these is the inclusion of express rules of interpretation. The preliminary draft of the Hague Judgments Conventionfollowing the lead of earlier private law conventions 38-wisely

includes an express directive that in interpretive inquiries national
courts must have regard for its "international character" and "the
need to promote uniformity in its application."3 I have elsewhere
emphasized the importance of such express rules of interpretation in

international private law conventions.40 In the context of legal transition costs, such express directives can broaden the field of available
materials in learning the law and thus lessen the likelihood and im-

pact of interpretive error.
Separately, much is to be gained from expressly addressing the

role of national courts in filling gaps in an international convention's
regulatory scheme. By doing so, drafters can prospectively resolve
thorny questions over the hierarchy of norms, specifically whether na-

tional courts are empowered to construct conforming additions to international legal regimes or resort to otherwise-applicable (and

nonuniform) national law. Whether an expansionist or restrictive approach is chosen, 41 a failure to do so can substantially increase uncer-

37. These concerns are enhanced with complex, multilayered legal systems such as that in
the United States. The uneven experience in this country with one private law convention that
elsewhere has been quite successful-the United Nations Sales Law Convention-accentuates
the value of clear legislative signals in the drafting and implementation of new international
norms. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (observing the lack of familiarity with the CISG
in the United States); infra note 54 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties courts in this
country have had in understanding their interpretive role for the Convention).
38. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 9, art. 7(1); UNIDROIT Convention on International
Financial Leasing, art. 6(1), May 28, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 922, 933-34 (1988);
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, art. 4(1), May 28, 1988, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 922, 945 (1988).
39. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 38(1).
40. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687,
731-34 (1998).
41. There may be sound reasons for a more restrictive approach for procedural rules such
as those contemplated in the proposed Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty. For private law treaties
whose purpose is to regulate the rights and obligations of private parties in specific fields in a
comprehensive fashion, such as in the case of the United Nations Sales Convention, long-term
success may depend substantially on the power of courts to develop existing rules to cover
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tainty and error costs associated with an avoidable problem that has

perennially plagued courts in this country in resolving the interaction
between federal and state law.
Along the same line, transition cost analysis highlights for international norms the importance of reaping the accumulated certainty
in the resolution of specific normative issues. 42 That is, where a new
body of law covers the same subject matter as (or is merely a revision
of) an existing one, drafters may prospectively mitigate transition
costs by carefully addressing-either through express approval or re-

jection-the experience gained with the existing normative solutions
and the related interpretive precedent. The result of such a practice

is to avoid much of the learning, uncertainty, and kindred costs of the
new legal norms.
At certain points, the commentary of the proposed DreyfussGinsburg treaty purports to do just that, by referring to existing na-

tional practice on certain issues.43 From the perspective of legal

transition costs, this approach is to be lauded. Indeed, such references to past experience are particularly important for legal norms
structured as open-ended standards rather than narrowly tailored
rules. 44 In order to reap the full benefits of the accumulated certainty
on such issues, however, the commentary should make clear the ex-

tent to which the referenced past interpretive precedent is binding or
merely persuasive in the interpretation of the proposed new international norms.
unforeseen technological, social, or other changes in the field. See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note
40, at 761-91 (arguing that an expansive approach to the general principles gap-filling
methodology in the U.N. Sales Convention is appropriate to ensure its long-term success). A
more restrictive approach may be appropriate, in contrast, for a more technical treaty such as
the statute of limitations treaty that is a companion to the U.N. Sales Convention. See id., at
730-31 n.178 (offering this observation) (citing Convention on the Limitation Period in the
International Sale of Goods, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 952 (1974), and Protocol Amending the
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, Annex II, reprintedin
19 I.L.M. 696 (1980)).
42. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 860 (observing that legal transition costs can be
mitigated by expressly addressing the continuing effect of past interpretative precedent in the
adoption of new legal norms).
43. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 16, cmt. at 1115 (noting that the approach in
article 9 "is derived from US federal jurisdiction law, 28 U.S.C. § 1367"); id. arts. 1, 2 & cmt. at
1096 (stating that "line drawing" with regard to scope of the Draft Convention would be
difficult but noting that "experiences in national judicial systems may be helpful" and citing
certain precedent from the United States); id. at 1070-71 (noting with regard to consolidation
that "[b]oth US and European laws have mechanisms to promote consolidation, and the
techniques of both systems are invoked here").
44. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 833-35 (discussing the special value of interpretive
precedent for legal norms structured as standards).
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This brings us to the potentially important role of the DreyfussGinsburg commentary itself. For purposes of transition cost analysis,
there is much to recommend an official commentary to guide the interpretation and application of a new body of law. The official comments appended to each of the sections of the Uniform Commercial
45
Code in this country provide a positive model in this regard.
Though only persuasive, these official comments have served to assist

in the learning of the law, decrease uncertainty costs, and limit instances of interpretive error. Given the complexities inherent in interpretation by disparate national courts, a concern for the effects of

legal transition costs counsels strongly in favor of a similar instrument
(along the lines of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg commentary) for a new in46
ternational private law treaty.
B.

Enhancingthe Role of MediatingInstitutions in the Development
of InternationalPrivate Law

A final step in understanding the true impact of legal transition
costs is to recognize the important role of "mediating institutions" in
the assimilation of new legal norms. 7 Traditionally, the most promi-

nent mediating institution has been the public court system. Through
their published (and thus public) interpretive opinions, state courts
can assist in the learning of the law by the public at large, speed the
clarification of legal uncertainties, and add coherence to comprehensive or complicated bodies of law. Indeed, as we have seen, by clarifying and disseminating knowledge about the law, state court
interpretive decisions in effect represent public goods.4 8 As should be
readily apparent at this point in the analysis, the net effect of these

functions of state courts is to diminish the learning, uncertainty, and
kindred costs associated with the adoption of new legal norms.

45. For a discussion of the role of the Official Comments to the U.C.C., see generally
Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966
Wis. L. REV. 597 (discussing the background and purpose for the Official Comments). See also
Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 565-66 (2000) (noting that the purpose of the
comments was to provide detailed guidance to the courts in applying the Code).
46. Interests of certainty suggest, however, that the drafters expressly resolve the precise
force of such a commentary. Specifically, the drafters should clarify whether the "official"
commentary should operate in lieu of, or merely as a hierarchically superior supplement to, the
drafting history (commonly known as the travaux preparatoires).
47. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 862-68 (comprehensively addressing the role of
mediating institutions with regard to legal transition costs).
48. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
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The effectiveness of state courts in their traditional role as mediating institutions may be diminished, however, for multilateral private
law treaties. Because responsibility for the application of such treaties rests with the disparate national courts of the member states,
there is no single institution empowered to render final, authoritative
interpretations on disputed issues. This problem is compounded in

this country because the already overburdened national Supreme
Court is unlikely to have the capacity or inclination to provide final
national guidance on such private law issues except in rare circumstances. 49 Moreover, the presence of multiple equally authoritative

interpretations increases the likelihood of inconsistent interpretations
for multilateral private law treaties. 0 These special complications for
multilateral treaties suggest a need to enhance the effectiveness of
existing mediating institutions and consider the creation of new ones.
The first, and perhaps easiest, measure in this regard would be to

mandate more effective interaction between national courts on interpretive inquiries. This mandate could take the form of an express
directive-such as the one contemplated in the preliminary draft of
the proposed Hague Judgments Convention 5'-

directing national

courts to give appropriate deference to prior interpretive decisions by
courts in other member states. Such an express directive is an important supplement to the common instruction in private law treaties that
courts should have regard for the interests of uniformity of interpretation. 2 Although the deference to prior interpretive decisions is
implicit in such a uniformity directive,5 3 the record of courts in this
country has been less than exemplary in this regard.5 4 An express di49. I have more to say on this point infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
50. Cf. D'Amato, supra note 15, at 10 (suggesting that an increase in potentially
inconsistent interpretive precedent can lead to an increase in uncertainty).
51. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 38(2) ("The courts of each
Contracting State shall, when applying and interpreting the Convention, take due account of the
case law of other Contracting States.").
52. See supra note 38 (citing the uniformity directive in other private law treaties).
53. See Van Alstine, supra note 40, at 732 (arguing with regard to a similar provision in the
UN Sales Convention that "[i]mplicit in the required deference to uniformity is an instruction to
adjudicators to give mutual deference to prior interpretive decisions by courts of other member
states"); id. at 786-91 (exploring this point in greater detail).
54. With regard to the United Nations Sales Convention, for example, there are already
over 850 reported decisions on its application and interpretation by courts in the various
member states. For a compilation of such cases, see the CISG Case Schedule at http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/text/-casesschedule.html (last visited March 13, 2002). In spite of this, courts
in the United States continue to express the view that "there is virtually no case law under the
Convention." See Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995);
see also Supermicro Computer, Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1151 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (stating that "[t]he case law interpreting and applying the CISG is sparse"); Claudia,
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rective of appropriate deference, therefore, should enhance the effectiveness of the disparate national courts as mediating institutions for
multilateral treaties.
To support this interaction between national courts, the international institution under whose auspices a new treaty is adopted-the
Hague Conference on Private International Law in the case of the
proposed Hague Judgments Convention and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg
Draft Convention on Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters-should consider the creation of a mechanism for the
dissemination of knowledge about interpretive decisions by courts in
the various member states. A model of such a system is the so-called
"CLOUT" system (Case Law On UNCITRAL Texts) established by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for private law conventions created under its auspices. Under the CLOUT
system, the Secretariat of UNCITRAL arranges for the collection of
interpretive decisions, and for the preparation, translation, and dissemination of abstracts of the decisions.55 A preliminary draft of the
Hague Judgments Convention proposes a similar, if less ambitious,
system.5 6 A sensitivity to legal transition costs suggests that such a
system should be adopted for the proposed Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty,
as well as for similar private law conventions.
A more ambitious measure to address the special obstacles of
multilateral treaties is the creation of entirely new mediating institutions. One promising option-which follows the model of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, and has
already been proposed for the U.N. Sales Convention 5 7-is the establishment of a standing committee of experts to oversee the operation
of a new multilateral treaty after adoption. The purpose of such a
body would be to monitor developments in the interpretation of the
treaty, identify particularly contentious interpretive issues, propose

S.N.C. v. Olivieri Footware, Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB)(THK), 1998 WL 164824, *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 7, 1998) (stating same); Helen Kaminski Pty., Ltd. v. Mktg. Australian Prods., Inc., Nos. M47 (DLC), 96B46519, 97-8072A, 1997 WL 414137, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 1997) (asserting that
there is "little to no case law on the CISG in general").
55. The information collected under the CLOUT system can be found at the homepage of
UNCITRAL at http://www.uncitral.org/english/clout/index.htm (last visited March 13, 2002).
56. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 39(1).
57. See Michael Joachim Bonell, A Proposalfor the Establishmentof a PermanentEditorial
Board for the Vienna Sales Convention, in INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE 241
(1988); see also John E. Murray, Jr., The Neglect of CISG-A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. &
COM. 365 (1998) (supporting this suggestion).
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solutions, and, where appropriate, offer nonbinding interpretive
opinions.58
Another option in the same vein is the creation of ad hoc panels
of experts to respond to inquiries in specific disputes. An innovative
proposal in this regard is contained in a preliminary draft of the proposed Hague Judgments Convention. Article 40 of that convention

empowers the permanent bureau of the Hague Conference to establish a "committee of experts" to respond to inquiries by the parties to

a dispute or by courts of a member state regarding the interpretation
of the Convention.59 If such interpretive decisions are made publicly
available, these ad hoc committees of experts in effect will function as

a new form of mediating institutions.
The net effect of all of these suggestions is to assist in the assimilation of new multilateral treaties. By enhancing the cooperation
among existing national courts and creating new forms of international mediating institutions, lawmakers in effect expand the storehouse of source material for learning about the content of new
international law, speed the resolution of uncertainties about its precise meaning and effect, and decrease the likelihood of interpretive
error. In other words, these new and enhanced forms of mediating

institutions can more effectively ameliorate the impact of legal transition costs for new multilateral private law conventions such as that
proposed by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg for the recognition of
international intellectual property judgments.
One final note is appropriate about the effectiveness of mediating institutions on international law issues in the United States. Because treaty law is federal law, the only body with the authority to
provide final, national interpretations on disputed issues is the United
States Supreme Court. With the continuing expansion of federal law
in this and other fields, however, the Supreme Court is now increas-

58. A preliminary draft of the proposed Hague Judgments Convention suggests that the
Secretary General of the Hague Conference establish such a body. See 1999 Draft Hague
Convention, supra note 36, art. 39(2) (proposing a "special commission" to meet "at regular
intervals.., to review the operation of the Convention"). Under the proposal, the special
commission would be empowered to make recommendations "on the application or
interpretation" of the Hague Judgments Convention and to "propose modifications or revisions
of the Convention or the addition of protocols," presumably for later consideration by the
Hague Conference as a whole. See id. art. 39(3).
59. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 40 (authorizing the permanent
bureau, "[u]pon a joint request of the parties to a dispute in which the interpretation of the
Convention is at issue, or of a court of a Contracting State" to assist in the establishment of a
"committee of experts to make recommendations to such parties or such court").
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ingly unlikely to be able to fulfill this function. 6° As scholars of intellectual property are well aware, the one notable exception to this rule
is the specialized jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 61 In matters outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit,
however, one consequence of the continuing expansion of federal law
(including treaty law) is a likely increase in legal transition costs from
the increased delay in the national resolution of intercircuit interpretive conflicts. As I argued in The Costs of Legal Change, a fuller appreciation of the impact of legal transition costs should spur more
active consideration of structural changes to enhance the effectiveness of national mediating institutions in this country, including in
62
particular in the field of treaty law.
CONCLUSION

Like the broader uniform international law movement in general, the proposed treaty on jurisdiction and judgments in intellectual
property matters promises substantial benefits for participants in the
field. Indeed, by clearing away existing uncertainties and otherwise
facilitating the enforcement of judgments, the treaty also promises to
enhance the value of the underlying principles of international intellectual property law itself. As we have seen, however, the adoption
of new legal norms-in particular in the form of a multilateral
treaty- also may involve serious transitional costs for the international legal system. The message of transition cost analysis is that an
appropriate sensitivity to these real and potentially substantial legal
transition costs may ease the assimilation of such beneficial legal reforms, and as a result facilitate their acceptance in the first place.

60. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 864-65 (examining this point in greater detail).
61. The federal circuit has sole appellate authority, among other things, over matters of
patent law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). Professor Dreyfuss has offered one of the leading
examinations of this experiment. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
62. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 864-66.

